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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the short-run and long-run performance of the largest 49
stocks in Hong Kong market which experience weekly price movements of more than
±10% between 1999 and 2007. For both decline and increase events, one-week
significant reversal is documented. But such reversal in returns diminishes very
quickly within two or three weeks. From a long-run perspective, I find that large price
increases are followed by negative performance, which is consistent with the
overreaction hypothesis. However, large price declines are also followed by negative
cumulative abnormal returns, which supports the underreaction hypothesis. Such
findings indicate that the reaction of investors in the Hong Kong market is marked by
a distinct asymmetry. Generally, investors in Hong Kong overreact to good news and
underreact to bad ones, which is in support of the overoptimism hypothesis.
Furthermore, for decline (increase) events, underreaction (overreaction) is
documented to be stronger for larger firms and glamour firms than for smaller firms
and value firms.
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11. Introduction
There are three main hypotheses related to investor behaviors following extreme
events in the area of finance. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is one of the
most famous theories in finance, which states that in equity markets where prices
react to information efficiently and incorporate news quickly and accurately, investors
should be unable to predict future returns and make abnormal profits. A market
reaction consistent with this hypothesis would be one where all information contained
in a shock is incorporated immediately in equity prices. The Overreaction Hypothesis
(OH) suggests that investors will overreact to the arrival of new information and
correct their behavior later. As a result, a positive (negative) shock should be followed
by a decline (increase) in prices. The Underreaction Hypothesis (UH), on the other
hand, suggests that market participants will underreact to the arrival of new
information and correct their behavior later. As a result, a large price increase (decline)
should be followed by further increase (decline) in prices.
For years, the notion of informationally efficient equity markets has been challenged
by many academic researchers and they have long been exploring these hypotheses by
examining patterns in stock returns. Many studies document a strong return reversal
in the short run and argue that the stock market overreacts to information and
irrationally misprices winners or losers. In the U.S. market, for example, Lehmann
(1990) documents that stocks with the lowest returns over the prior week or month
tend to outperform those with the highest returns over the prior period.
The overreaction hypothesis, first applied by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) in finance, is
examined extensively in both U.S. market as well as those outside the U.S. In
interpreting the documented phenomenon, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) argue that in
2both the winners and losers portfolios, investors essentially overreacted. In the case of
loser stocks, investors overreacted to bad news, driving the stocks' share prices down
disproportionately. After some time, investors realized that their pessimism was not
entirely justified, and these losers began rebounding as investors came to the
conclusion that the stock was underpriced. The exact opposite is true with the winners
portfolio: investors eventually realized that their exuberance wasn't totally justified.
However, some contradictory evidence is presented for both short run and long run.
Zarowin (1990) attributes the documented reversal phenomenon to the size effect and
argues that if winners and losers are formed using firms of the same size, the return
discrepancy disappears. Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) suggest that prices underreact
to information and this underreaction produces profitable “momentum” profits which
are from a strategy where one goes long a portfolio consisting of stocks that have
performed very well in the past and goes short a portfolio consisting of stocks that
have very poor performance in the past. In the long run, Gutierrez and Kelley (2008)
find long-lasting continuations in returns rather than the previously documented
reversal.
To explain the documented “anomalies”, many explanations have been put forward in
the literature. For instance, Lo and Mackinlay (1990) suggest that when some stocks
react more quickly than others, a contrarian strategy may still produce profits even if
neither stock overreacts to information. In other words, a lead-lag relationship among
returns is an important factor which contributes to contrarian profits. Conrad and Kaul
(1993) argue that an explanation of contrarian profits may lie on bid-ask biases and
infrequent trading, while Cox and Peterson (1994) document evidence consistent with
the bid-ask bounce and liquidity as explanation of price reversals. Fama and French
(1996) argue that a three-factor model captures the long-term return reversals
documented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) but is unable to explain the evidence of
return continuations presented in Jagadeesh and Titman (1993). Daniel, Hirshleifer
and Subrahmanyam (1998) assume that investors are overconfident and the
3subsequent arrival of information which either confirms or disconfirms investor
private information will lead to asymmetric reaction.
Bowman and Iverson (1998) argue that the overreaction and underreaction hypotheses
are derived from basic human biases in information processing. So, if they are
substantive, they should manifest themselves in many other markets, besides the U.S.
one. Thus, this paper tries to contribute to the stream of research by investigating the
behavior of stock returns in a market outside that of the U.S. Stock return patterns
following large one week movements are examined by using the most recent weekly
data in Hong Kong stock market from 1999 to 2007. Specifically, I select the largest
49 firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.1 Such stocks represent the
majority of the market capitalization in Hong Kong, more than 70% out of the total
market capitalization. For example, in the end of 2007, the largest firms together have
a market capitalization of 14,624 billion Hong Kong dollars, representing 71.21% out
of the total market capitalization of 20,536 billion Hong Kong dollars2. They are all
highly liquid and available to investors, representing more than 50% of the total
trading volume and more than 70% of the total trading value. For each stock, I
calculate the abnormal returns over the period of two weeks prior to and up to 52
weeks after the defined events. Cumulative abnormal returns are used to explore the
phenomenon of overreaction or underreaction. Usually, price increases and declines
are associated with good news and bad news respectively. Thus, we can examine how
investors react to the arrival to new information.
An investigation of stock return patterns in the Hong Kong market is of intrinsic value
for several reasons. Firstly, Hong Kong has one of the largest stock exchanges in the
world by market capitalization. This market ranked nine at the end of 2004 and six at
the end of 2006 in terms of its size. It is the second largest in the Asia-Pacific region
after the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Secondly, as Otchere and Chan (2003) noted, there
1 See Appendix I for a reference.
2 See Appendix II for the total market size and the market capitalization of the selected firms between 1999 and
2007.
4are some unique institutional factors differentiating the Hong Kong market from the
U.S market. For example, relatively few regulatory constraints exist in this market.
Neither dividends nor capital gains are taxed in the individual level. Individuals and
corporations are taxed a relatively low rate. Such favorable tax policy means that
when we study the topic of market efficiency in Hong Kong, we could expect little
tax-induced distortions. Although explicitly considering such issues is beyond the
scope of this paper, such differences are worth noting.
Another factor that makes it worthwhile to examine overreaction or underreaction in
this market is the change in short-selling restrictions. Short-selling of securities was
generally not permitted in Hong Kong until January 1994, and only seven securities
were eligible when the short-selling program began. However, this program has
expanded since then, and by 26 November 2007, 567 highly liquid and capitalized
stocks were available for short selling. The ability of selling short a stock is essential
to any contrarian (momentum) strategy since one must be able to sell short the
winners (losers) in order to exploit the market’s overreaction (underreaction)
phenomenon and earn excess profits (if any). The 49 firms examined in this paper are
all highly liquid with a large capitalization. It is feasible for investors to sell short
such stocks if the overreaction (underreaction) phenomenon is documented and
confirmed in Hong Kong.
The results of this study are summarized as follows: For both decline and increase
events, one-week significant reversals are documented. But such reversals in returns
diminish very quickly within two or three weeks. From a long-run perspective, I find
that large price increases are followed by negative performance, which is consistent
with the overreaction hypothesis. However, I further find that large price declines are
also followed by negative cumulative abnormal returns, which supports the
underreaction hypothesis. Such findings indicate that the reaction of investors in the
Hong Kong market is marked by a distinct asymmetry, which is consistent with the
argument in Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998). Market participants
5generally overreact to good news while underreact to bad news, which is in support of
the overoptimism hypothesis in the Hong Kong market.
Several tests of robustness of the results are performed. Firstly, periods of high market
sentiment is controlled. Then, I investigate the interdependence of large price
movements with one another. Thirdly, I explore the impact of firm size, the size of the
initial price movement, market-to-book ratio, and industry membership on the
reactions of the stock prices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
introduction to the existing body of relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data
sample and methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the performance results.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
There have been extensive empirical studies examining patterns in stock prices.
Regardless of the different methodologies used in such studies, many researchers
proffered the Overreaction Hypothesis or Underreaction Hypothesis as explanations
of the phenomena they documented. Specifically, they examined whether observed
anomalous movements in stock prices can be explained by the corrections of
investors’ disproportionate reactions to new information. Some document return
reversals and thus are in favor of the Overreaction Hypothesis, while others document
momentum in returns and vote for the Underreaction Hypothesis. Cross-sectional
aspects such as market capitalization, bid-ask spread, growth opportunity, etc., are
often employed to explain over- and underreaction.
62.1 Literature on overreaction and return reversals
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) are deemed as the first to develop the overreaction
hypothesis, which states that a given stock’s price goes up (down) too much because
of recent good (bad) news associated with the stock but eventually when investors
realize they have overreacted, the stock price reverses direction and returns to its
fundamental value. This is regarded as a violation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH) since it would indicate that stock prices are predictable in the long run. In a
later paper, DeBondt and Thaler (1987) further suggest that the extreme price
reversals are not due to seasonality, size effect, or changes in risk as measured by
beta.
Zarowin (1990) replicates the work of DeBondt and Thaler (1985), controlling for
size differences between winners and losers. When winner and loser portfolios are
formed using firms of the same size, the return discrepancy disappears. Furthermore,
when losers are smaller, they outperform the winners; when winners are smaller, they
outperform the losers. Therefore, he concludes that the tendency for losers to
outperform the winners is due to the fact that loser firms are typically smaller than
winners.
Atkins and Dyl (1990) find that in the short run, the stock market overreacts,
especially when considering stocks exhibiting large price declines. However, they
report that traders are unable to profit from the realized price reversals because of the
magnitude of the bid-ask spread and thus conclude that when transaction costs are
taken into account, the market is efficient.
Lehmann (1990) uses weekly returns to rank stocks and finds that portfolios of stocks
with positive returns in one week typically experience negative returns in the
following week, while those with negative returns in one week typically display
7positive returns in the following week. Furthermore, in contrast with the finding of
Atkins and Dyl (1990), he suggests that arbitrage profits from trading on these
patterns persist even after adjusting for the bid-ask spread and transaction costs.
Instead of ranking stocks by their performance in a given time period and choosing
the top and bottom performers, other studies evaluate the Overreaction Hypothesis by
establishing a trigger return value and examining the subsequent performance of the
stocks meeting the criteria. Bremer and Sweeney (1991) examine the reversal pattern
of large stock price decreases. They document that stocks experiencing a one-day
return of less than -10% tend to rebound for a cumulative 2.2% increase in price over
the following two days.
Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) conduct a comprehensive examination of the
Overreaction Hypothesis. They use the empirically determined price of beta risk and
calculate abnormal returns using a comprehensive adjustment for price. They
document a significant overreaction effect which cannot be attributed to size or beta.
Cox and Peterson (1994) argue that if liquidity is an important factor in the reversal
process, one would expect stronger reversals in less liquid markets and for smaller
firms. If the reversal is caused by investors’ overreaction, then we should observe that
the greater the one-day decline, the greater the reversal. They document significant
reversals for days one to three, which is consistent with results from previous work.
Also, they document the fact that the degree of reversals declines through time.
What’s more, they find that small firms reverse more than larger firms and most of the
reversals can be explained by the bid-ask spread. The results suggest that larger initial
declines do not necessarily lead to greater subsequent reversals and thus do not
support the Overreaction Hypothesis.
Jagadeesh and Titman (1995) examines the contribution of stock price overreaction
and delayed reaction to the profitability of contrarian strategies. They find evidence
8that stock prices overreact to firm-specific information, but react with a delay to
common factors. Besides the stock market overreaction explanation, they also support
the role of liquidity in explaining stock price reversals.
In a more recent paper, Benou and Richie (2003) examines the long-run reversal
pattern for a sample of large U.S. firms that experience significant stock price declines
of more than 20 percent during a specific month. They find evidence largely
consistent with the Overreaction Hypothesis and document that the magnitude and
trend of that reversal differs substantially across industries.
2.2 Literature on underreaction and return continuations
Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) find the strategy of buying winners and selling losers
generate significant positive returns over 3- to 12-month holding periods. They argue
that the profitability of this strategy is not due to systematic risk or delayed stock
price reactions to common factors.
Hong and Stein (1999) assume two types of investors that either rely exclusively on
their own private information (newswatchers) or rely exclusively on past price
information (momentum trader) and develop a model that predicts initial
underreaction to information and a subsequent overreaction.
Benou (2003) examines the behavior of ADR prices following months in which they
experienced a decline of 15% or more. Evidence shows that the ADR returns do not
exhibit a reversal pattern and tend to be characterized by momentum. Such findings
are supportive of the Underreaction Hypothesis rather than Overreaction Hypothesis.
Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), by constructing a portfolio that is long stocks in the
9highest decile of the prior week’s return and short stocks in the lowest decile,
document long-lasting continuations in returns rather than the previously documented
reversal. They find that the subsequent momentum profits are strong enough to offset
the initial reversal and to produce a significant momentum effect over the full year
following portfolio formation. Thus, they argue that, ex post, extreme weekly returns
are not too extreme.
2.3 Literature on markets outside that of the U.S.
In terms of markets outside that of the U.S., there are numbers of studies investigating
issues related to the overreaction and underreaction of investors. Brailsford (1992)
and Allen and Prince (1995), using Australian data, find evidence of significant price
reversals for only winner portfolio. Da Costa (1994) examines the overreaction
phenomenon in Brazilian market and documents price reversals in two-year returns
which are of a greater magnitude than those in the U.S. Richard (1997), by ranking
the stock market indices of 16 countries, documents that the international stock
market indices tend to display positive autocorrelation in the short-run. However,
when the holding period is extended to one year, the ranking period losers begin to
outperform ranking period winners. Following the methodology of DeBondt and
Thaler (1985), Baytas and Cakici (1999) examine a sample of stocks from seven
developed countries: the U.S., Canada, Japan, the U.K., Germany, France and Italy.
They document long-run overreaction in all markets except the U.S. Bremer, Hiraki,
and Sweeney (1999), using Japanese weekly stock returns, observe a short-term
reversal pattern and find that the reversal for losers is related to trading volume, as
losers with high volume in one week have a larger reversal in the following week.
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3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Sample and data description
This paper examines a sample of the largest companies listed on the Hong Kong stock
market. The selected 49 companies represent the majority of the market capitalization
in the market, more than 70% out of the total market capitalization.
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) fact books list 50 leading companies in market
capitalization for each year during 1999-2007. There are 22 local companies
appearing consistently among the Top 50 during the nine years. Due to the access of
more and more H shares, some local companies appearing among the Top 50 in early
years disappeared in recent years.3 On the other hand, some H shares, such as China
Construction Bank Corporation, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd., Bank
of China Ltd., and Ping An Insurance (Group) Co. of China Ltd., become members
among the Top 50 recently with high rankings.
To choose representative companies with large market capitalization in Hong Kong
stock market, for local companies, I select those appearing among the Top50 for at
least five times during the nine years and the resulting number of companies is 44. For
the new H shares with large market capitalization, I select those being listed on Hong
Kong stock market for at least four years and the selected companies are: PetroChina
Co. Ltd., China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (formerly, Sinopec Corporation),
China Telecom Corporation Ltd., China Life Insurance Co. Ltd., and Ping An
Insurance (Group) Co. of China Ltd.. The appendix I lists all the 49 companies in the
sample.
3 H shares refer to the shares of companies incorporated in mainland China that are traded on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange.
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Prior research finds reversals in weekly returns. As Roll (1984) noted, when using
returns formed with transaction prices, part of the documented reversal is due to the
spurious negative correlation induced by bid-ask bounce. Following Kaul and
Nimalendran (1990), I eliminate this spurious reversal by using quote data instead of
transaction prices. Weekly returns are based on the midpoint of the final bid and ask
quotes from Friday to Friday from 1999 through 2007. Stocks priced below five
dollars at the end of event week t are excluded. The data comes from the Bloomberg
Financial Service database.
With mid-point returns in hand, I define the return on a stock at week t as being a
“large price decline” if it is below -10% and the return on a stock as being a “large
price increase” if it is above 10%. The choice of the trigger value ±10% is because
that earlier studies on U.S. market often use a threshold of 20% for monthly data
when examining return patterns following large price movements. But in Hong Kong
market, stock prices fluctuate more dramatically than that in the U.S. and it is easy for
them to go up and down by 5% within a week. Even though monthly trigger values of
20% translate to average weekly trigger values of about 4.6%, for weekly data in
Hong Kong, a threshold of 10% is more reasonable. To ensure that there are 52 weeks
before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.4 This results in a
sample that consists of 562 events, among which 247 are “decline” events and 315 are
“increase” events. Table 1 provides a summary description of events across years and
months.
From Table 1, we can see that in earlier years just following the Asia Financial Crisis,
events happened more frequently than in later years. This may indicate that the Hong
Kong stock market becomes more stable as time goes by after the crisis because of
fewer extreme events in later years. Increase events distribute more evenly across
months. Fewer decline events happened in December than in other months.
4 Because of the asset pricing model estimation, I need 52 weeks before each event even though I’m not
considering the stock price reaction that far before.
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The data sample combines a total of 20990 returns in the period between January
1999 and December 2007. Figure 1 shows the return distribution of the whole data
sample.
Figure 2 provides the return distribution of the events, themselves. The average return
of a decline is -13.4% with a standard deviation of 3.51%. The lowest one week return,
-35.59%, took place in September 2001 for the firm China Resources Enterprise. The
group of increases has an average return of 13.88% and a standard deviation of 4.56%.
The largest event occurred in December 1999 for the firm Pacific Century
Cyberworks with a 60.61% return in one week.
3.2 Methodology
To measure abnormal returns of the sample, I use two different benchmarks-the
market model and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The use of the different
benchmark models enhances the robustness and validity of the results.
The first model is commonly used in measuring abnormal returns. As Brown and
Warner (1985) noted, the market model performs well in detecting abnormal
performance of securities under a wide variety of conditions. Here, the Hang Seng
Index (HSI) is used as the market index.
The CAPM takes into account the possible effects of interest rate fluctuation. The
level of interest rates plays an important role in a rational investment decision.
Investors behave in response to the change of interest rates. If the interest rate
increases, investors are more likely to invest a greater portion of capital into
fix-income securities and less in stocks.
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The parameters of the models are estimated using data from t=-52 to t=-1.5 The
abnormal returns for each event are then calculated from t=-2 to t=4 using the two
benchmark models discussed above. Then the average abnormal returns for the
sample from t=1 up to t=52 are cumulated over different periods to form cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs).
4. Empirical Results and Analyses
4.1 Performance of weekly extreme stocks
I begin by evaluating the performance of stocks with extreme weekly returns over a
relatively short horizon-two weeks prior to and four weeks after the event. Table 2
provides the average weekly abnormal returns for a large decline. Both the market
model and the CAPM provide qualitatively similar results.6
An average large abnormal decline of at least -10.17% is measured in the week of the
event, which is in line with the definition of a “large price decline”. The two weeks
prior to the event show significantly negative abnormal returns between -1.0% and
-1.4%. The reversal in the first week following the event is strong, averaging around
0.8%. Since I am using mid-point returns, bid-ask bounce is clearly not the sole
source of the documented reversal. This result is consistent with Lehmann (1990),
who documents one-week return reversal in the U.S. market using weekly data. Lo
and MacKinlay (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) identify nonsynchronous
trading, inventory management by dealers, and investor overreaction to firm-specific
5 Other estimation horizons are also used, such as t=-52 to t=-5. Results remain qualitatively similar and thus I just
report results estimated from t=-52 to t=-1.
6 Thus, in later tables, only results from the market model are reported.
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news as possible sources of the reversal. 7 Consistent with all three of these
hypotheses, I find that the reversal in returns diminishes very quickly: though the AR
for the second week is also positive, it’s insignificant. Then for the next two weeks,
abnormal returns become negative, insignificant for week 3 but significant for week 4.
Table 3 reports the abnormal returns for large price increase. Similarly, I find
significantly negative abnormal returns for the two weeks prior to an increase, ranging
between -0.7% and -1.1%. Reversal is also evident in the first week following the
event but for the next three weeks, abnormal returns are all insignificant and without a
clear pattern. Due to the strong reversal in the first week and the negative though
insignificant abnormal return in the third week, the CAR for the [1:4]-week interval is
negative but insignificant.
Motivated by Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), besides examining short term performance
following extreme events, I also examine the performance over a longer horizon up to
52 weeks. Table 4 and Table 5 provide weekly cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
for large price declines and increases, respectively. For decline events, I measure
highly significant, negative CARs for almost all the periods. The CARs reach as high
as -5.16% for the [4:52]-week interval. This long-term performance analysis strongly
supports the Underreaction Hypothesis rather than the Overreaction Hypothesis. For
increase events, highly significant, negative CARs are also documented. Such results
are quite consistent with the Overreaction Hypothesis, indicating that large price
increases are followed by CARs in the opposite direction.
To summarize, for such extreme events, I document strong reversals in the first week
following the events. However, the documented reversals diminish so quickly that
they reverse direction within two or three weeks. From long-term perspective, for
both decline and increase events, CARs are significantly negative up to 52-week
horizon. Thus, I find that investors in Hong Kong stock market underreact to bad
7 Prices quoted by dealers are found to be inversely related to their inventory, which is mean reverting.
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news but overreact to good ones, which supports an overoptimistic hypothesis in
Hong Kong market and is also consistent with the argument of Daniel, Hirshleifer and
Subrahmanyam (1998) that investors are generally overconfident and the subsequent
arrival of information which either confirms or disconfirms investor private
information will lead to asymmetric reaction.
Figure 3 shows the combined CARs for the two kinds of events. Except for the event
week, both curves display a steady negative trend. What’s more, from the graph, we
can tell that the effect of the event is stronger in the first half of the year (26 weeks)
following the event than in the next half of the year, because the curves drop more
dramatically in the first few weeks and then become smoother later on.
4.2 Analysis of market sentiment
As Ising et al. (2006) noted, the observed phenomenon might be due to a general
market disturbance which is corrected in the subsequent weeks. Thus, in this part, I
analyze the relationship between market sentiment and post-event performance.
I define a market return which falls below -5% or exceeds 5% as an indicator for
strong market sentiment at the time of the event. To form the events sample, I only
include those corresponding to a moderate market return which is greater than -5%
and less than 5%. Table 6 provides the results for decline events without a strong
market sentiment. We can see that for the two weeks prior to the event, the abnormal
returns are highly significantly negative, similar to the results for the overall sample
but more pronounced in magnitude. The one-week reversal is quite evident. I
document insignificant negative ARs for the second and third weeks and significant
negative AR for the four week at 0.1 level. For the period from week one to week four,
the CAR is -0.58% and insignificant. For a longer horizon, 52 weeks following the
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event, the CAR is -4.61% at 0.01 significance level. Therefore, I find that the
documented underreaction for decline events cannot be explained by market
sentiment alone.
Table 7 summarizes the results for increase events. Again, they resemble those of the
overall sample, but more pronounced in magnitude. Significantly negative ARs are
found for the two weeks prior to the event. First-week reversal is strong. Then the
next three weeks exhibit insignificant ARs and so does the [1:4]-week interval. The
CAR for the long [1:52]-week is significantly negative with a value of -5.71%.
Thus, for both decline and increase events, I find no evidence supporting the
hypothesis that the documented over- and underreaction patterns can be attributed to
market sentiment.
4.3 Analysis of interdependence
Within the whole sample of 562 events, in 84 cases another event occurs in the week
following the decline or increase. The following event is of an opposite sign in 51
cases. A decline is followed by an increase in 22 cases and an increase is followed by
a decline in 29 cases. The interdependence analysis here is to explore serial
correlation of large price movements with one another, and to see how the exclusion
of subsequent events could affect the initial results.
Table 8 provides the abnormal returns for decline events without a subsequent event
in the following week. Evidence shows that significantly negative abnormal returns
exist in the two weeks prior to the event, similar to the result for the whole sample.
But due to the missing event in week one, the short term reversal is stronger. For the
first and second weeks following the event, significantly positive abnormal returns are
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found, with a value of 0.98% in the first week and 0.62% in the second week. This is
quite interesting and even surprising since there are more cases of subsequent reversal
events than subsequent momentum events, but the exclusion of subsequent events
increases the magnitude of short-term reversal. The reason is that in the initial sample,
even there are more reversal events than momentum events following declines, the
momentum events are more economically significant. Thus, when the cases with
subsequent events are excluded from the sample, stronger reversal is observed. The
CAR for [1:4]-week interval is significantly positive due to the evident and strong
reversal. The CAR for [1:52]-week interval is less pronounced in magnitude than for
the whole sample, though it is still significant.
Table 9 reports the results for increase events without a corresponding event in the
following week. Interestingly, less pronounced negative abnormal returns in the prior
two weeks are observed. But for the event week, the first week and second week after
the event, the documented abnormal returns are more evident. The CAR for
[1:4]-week interval is slightly significantly negative and the CAR for [1:52]-week
interval is much more pronounced in magnitude, with a value of-6.05%.
The two groups with a contrarian movement in the week following the event show a
different picture. Table 10 shows that for decline events followed by an increase, the
abnormal return for week one is significant at 0.01 level, with a value of 10.08%. The
CAR for [1:4]-week interval is 11.06%, highly significant and positive. The CAR for
the long [1:52]-week interval is slightly significant.
Table 11 reports the results for increase events with a decline in the following week.
Different from the results for the overall sample, the abnormal returns for the prior
two weeks are insignificant, though still negative. The AR in week one is highly
significant with a value of -13.07%. Due to the evident reversal in the first week, the
CAR for [1:4]-week interval is significantly negative. However, the CAR for the long
[1:52]-week interval is negative but insignificant with a value of -3.73%.
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4.4 Analysis of stock characteristics
Previous studies suggest that there are various factors that could influence the return
pattern following large price movements. Evidence from the U.S. market shows that
firm size matters. For large firms, stock price reversals are documented to be more
pronounced. In addition, Benou and Richie (2003) suggest that the intensity of the
price reversal depends on the size of the initial price movement. Furthermore, many
researchers, such as Fama and French (1998) and Conrad, Cooper, and Kaul (2003),
paid much attention on the different behavior of value and glamour stocks. The
book-to-market ratio is commonly used to measure the market’s expectation regarding
the firm’s ability to generate high cash flow in the future.
Thus, in this part, I analyze the influence of firm size, the size of the initial price
movement, and the growth opportunities on the CAR for the [1:26]-week interval for
large price declines and increases.
Table 12 reports the results of the cross-sectional regression analyses for decline
events. In model 1, only the return of the event week, R0, is included in the regression.
The coefficient on R0 is significant and negative, indicating that smaller initial
decline is associated with larger decline in the long-run. This is quite consistent with
the Underreaction Hypothesis. Note that in all the three regressions, the coefficients
on R0 are significantly negative, and the inclusion of other variables does not change
this fact.
In model 2, the log of firm size is included as an independent variable and the
coefficient on it is significantly negative at 0.1 level. This means that for larger firms,
underreaction is stronger than for smaller firms. This is quite intuitive since investors
often have an optimistic attitude towards larger firms. When bad news comes,
investors underreact in the short-run and correct their disproportionate reactions in the
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long-run.
In model 3, the log of market-to-book ratio is included. Since this is a proxy variable
for growth opportunities, significantly negative coefficient on it indicates that
underreaction is stronger for glamour firms than for value firms. This is also very
straightforward since market participants often trust glamour firms with a high
market-to-book ratio. The inclusion of this ratio does not change the sign on firm size.
In a word, for decline events, I find significant influence of R0 on the abnormal
returns of the following 26 weeks. For larger firms and glamour firms with a high
market-to-book ratio, underreaction is documented to be stronger than for smaller
firms and value firms. This means that investors in Hong Kong market are very
optimistic even when bad news comes.
I repeat the cross-sectional analyses for increase events and Table 13 reports the
corresponding results. Similar to the results in the case of decline events, the return of
the event week, R0, has significant influence on the abnormal returns of the following
26 weeks. Larger price spikes at the event week are associated with long-term
reversals, and the larger the price spike the larger the reversal, consistent with the
overreaction hypothesis. For larger firms and glamour firms, overreaction is stronger
since the coefficients on market capitalization and market-to-book ratio are both
significantly negative. This is quite plausible since investors with high expectation
regarding the firm’s future growth might behave more sensitively to good news.
When good news comes to larger and glamour firms, investors overreact to the
information and make the stock price too high. Later on, the stock price returns to its
fundamental value and the overreaction is eliminated.
In addition to the variables discussed above, the industry membership was previously
documented as a factor that might influence the return patterns. Thus, in a further step,
I include the industry membership of each firm into the regression using model 3(see
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the Appendix I for a reference of the industry membership for each firm). In the
sample, firms are divided into six industry groups: real estate/construction, energy,
consumer/retail, finance/insurance, travel/media, and telecom/technology. The results
are reported in Table 14. Since the coefficients on other variables are qualitatively
similar as in previous tables, I just report the coefficients on the membership. For both
decline and increase events, I find no evidence that industry membership influences
the documented over- and underreaction patterns.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, I examine a sample of the largest 49 firms in Hong Kong stock market
which experience a weekly price change of more than ±10%. Cumulative abnormal
returns are calculated up to 52 weeks following the events. Results show that
investors in Hong Kong market overreact to good news while underreact to bad ones.
For both decline and increase events, one-week significant reversal is documented.
But such reversal in returns diminishes very quickly within two or three weeks. From
a long-run perspective, I find that large price increases are followed by negative
performance, which is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. However, large
price declines are also followed by negative cumulative abnormal returns, which
supports the underreaction hypothesis. Such findings indicate that the reaction of
investors in the Hong Kong market is marked by a distinct asymmetry. Generally,
investors in Hong Kong overreact to good news and underreact to bad news, which is
in support of the overoptimism hypothesis. Furthermore, for decline (increase) events,
underreaction (overreaction) is documented to be stronger for larger firms and
glamour firms than for smaller firms and value firms. Industry membership does not
have power in explaining post-event performance.
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Appendix I
The companies in the sample and their corresponding industry category
HKEx fact books list 50 leading companies in market capitalization for each year during
1999-2007. There are 22 local companies appearing consistently among the Top 50 during the
nine years. Due to the access of more and more H shares, some local companies appearing among
the Top 50 in early years disappeared in recent years. On the other hand, some H shares become
members among the Top 50 recently with high rankings. To choose representative companies with
large market capitalization in Hong Kong stock market, for local companies, I select those
appearing among the Top50 for at least five times during the nine years and the resulting number
of companies is 44. For the new H shares with large market capitalization, I select those being
listed in Hong Kong stock market for at least four years and the resulting number is 5.
Firms in the sample are divided into six industry groups: real estate/construction, energy,
consumer/retail, finance/insurance, travel/media, and telecom/technology.
Code Company Industry Category
Local Shares:
1 Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. Real Estate/Construction
2 CLP Holdings Ltd. Energy
3 Hong Kong and China Gas Co. Ltd. Energy
4 Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. Consumer/Retail
5 HSBC Holdings PLC Finance/Insurance
6 Hongkong Electric Holdings Ltd. Energy
8 Pacific Century Cyberworks Real Estate/Construction
10 Hang Lung Development Real Estate/Construction
11 Hang Seng Bank Finance/Insurance
12 Henderson Land Real Estate/Construction
13 Hutchison Whampoa Consumer/Retail
16 Sun Hung Kai Properties Real Estate/Construction
17 New World Development Real Estate/Construction
26
19 Swire pacific ‘A’ Consumer/Retail
20 Wheelock and Co Real Estate/Construction
23 Bank of East Asia Finance/Insurance
53 Guoco Group Finance/Insurance
66 MTR Corporation Ltd. Travel/Media
69 Shangri-La Asia Travel/Media
83 Sino Land Co. Ltd. Real Estate/Construction
87 Swire pacific ‘B’ Consumer/Retail
97 Henderson Investment Real Estate/Construction
101 Hang Lung Properties Ltd. Real Estate/Construction
144 China Merchants Holdings
(International) Co. Ltd.
Travel/Media
179 Johnson Electric Holdings Telecom/Technology
267 CITIC Pacific Finance/Insurance
291 China Resources Enterprise Consumer/Retail
293 Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. Travel/Media
330 Esprit Holdings Ltd. Consumer/Retail
363 Shanghai Industrial Holdings Consumer/Retail
388 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Ltd.
Finance/Insurance
494 Li & Fung Ltd. Consumer/Retail
511 TVB Travel/Media
551 Yue Yuen Industrial Holdings Consumer/Retail
683 Kerry Properties Ltd. Real Estate/Construction
762 China Unicom Ltd. Telecom/Technology
883 CNOOC Ltd. Energy
906 China Netcom Group Corporation
(Hong Kong) Ltd.
Telecom/Technology
941 China Mobile Ltd. Telecom/Technology
27
992 Lenovo (formerly Legend) Holdings Telecom/Technology
1038 Cheung Kong Infrastructure Real Estate/Construction
1199 COSCO Pacific Travel/Media
2388 BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. Finance/Insurance
2888 Standard Chartered PLC Finance/Insurance
H Shares:
386 China Petroleum & Chemical
Corporation
Energy
728 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. Telecom/Technology
857 PetroChina Co. Ltd. Energy
2318 Ping An Insurance (Group) Co. of
China Ltd.
Finance/Insurance
2628 China Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Finance/Insurance
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Appendix II
The size of the selected firms and the total size of Hong Kong market
For the years between 1999 and 2007, the HKEx Fact Books estimate the total size of the whole
market as well as the market capitalization of the largest firms. The size of the Hong Kong market
and the size of the largest firms are both growing rapidly, but the percentage of the latter out of the
whole market is decreasing. However, the largest firms still represent more than 70% of the total
market capitalization.
Year Total size of the largest
firms(HK$ billion)
Total size of the whole
market(HK$ billion)
Percentage
1999 4,152 4,728 87.82%
2000 4,299 4,795 89.65%
2001 3,350 3,885 86.22%
2002 3,015 3,559 84.71%
2003 4,460 5,478 81.42%
2004 5,207 6,629 78.55%
2005 6,388 8,113 78.73%
2006 10,225 13,248 77.18%
2007 14,624 20,536 71.21%
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Figure 1. Return distribution of the overall sample
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns for the selected companies are formed from the
mid-points of the quoted bid and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars
at the end of event week are excluded. This figure provides an overview of the return distribution
within the overall data sample.
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Figure 2. Return distribution of events (declines and increases)
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns for the selected companies are formed from the
mid-points of the quoted bid and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars
at the end of event week are excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price
decline” if it is below -10% and the return on a stock as being a “large price increase” if it is above
10%. To ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000
to 2006. This figure provides an overview of the return distribution of the events.
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---▲--- Declines …*… Increases
Figure 3. CAR for large stock price decreases and increases over the period of 2 weeks prior to
and 52 weeks after the focal event
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Table 1-14
Table 1
Distribution of events across time: “declines” (panel A), “increases” (Panel B)
Each week from 1999 to 2007, I get stock price data for the selected companies from Bloomberg
Financial Service database. Weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid and
ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price decline” if it is below -10% and the
return on a stock as being a “large price increase” if it is above 10%. To ensure that there are 52
weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006. This provides a sample
which consists of 562 events, among which 247 are “decline” events and 315 are “increase”
events. This table shows a summary description of events across years and months.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
Panel A
2000 12 3 6 1 5 2 4 0 6 8 4 3 54
2001 1 0 8 3 0 9 0 11 17 4 1 2 56
2002 5 3 2 0 2 4 9 0 3 4 1 1 34
2003 4 0 3 6 1 0 3 0 5 1 0 0 23
2004 2 0 8 6 8 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 29
2005 3 0 1 12 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 1 24
2006 0 10 3 0 6 1 0 0 2 0 5 0 27
Total 27 16 31 28 22 19 16 13 39 17 12 7 247
Panel B
2000 9 11 8 6 4 7 5 2 12 3 6 7 80
2001 8 1 0 6 1 2 1 0 10 9 14 7 59
2002 6 1 4 2 3 2 1 0 0 12 4 0 35
2003 1 0 3 1 5 4 3 12 10 5 2 1 47
2004 14 3 2 1 5 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 29
2005 3 1 5 0 0 6 4 1 1 0 2 2 25
2006 3 1 2 8 3 5 2 2 3 0 4 7 40
Total 44 18 24 24 21 28 17 17 37 29 32 24 315
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Table 2
Weekly abnormal returns (ARs) surrounding large stock price declines
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price decline” if it is below -10%. To
ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.
In both market model and CAPM model, the expected return is estimated using the 52-week data
prior to each event. Then abnormal returns are calculated surrounding the events. Both models
produce similar findings. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent level, respectively.
Market Model CAPM
Event Week Abnormal Return(%) t-stat Abnormal Return(%) t-stat
-2 -1.07*** -3.14 -1.05*** -2.97
-1 -1.32*** -3.81 -1.29*** -3.75
0 -10.29*** -31.78 -10.17*** -29.58
1 0.79** 1.99 0.81** 2.36
2 0.30 1.57 0.34 1.62
3 -0.28 -0.87 -0.27 -0.84
4 -0.75** -2.45 -0.73** -2.34
[1:4] 0.06 1.03 0.15 1.32
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Table 3
Weekly abnormal returns surrounding large stock price increases
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price increase” if it is above 10%. To
ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.
In both market model and CAPM model, the expected return is estimated using the 52-week data
prior to each event. Then abnormal returns are calculated surrounding the events. Both models
produce similar findings. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent level, respectively.
Market Model CAPM
Event Week Abnormal Return(%) t-stat Abnormal Return(%) t-stat
-2 -0.75** -2.19 -0.73** -2.16
-1 -1.08*** -3.23 -1.04*** -3.01
0 10.02*** 35.57 10.14*** 35.76
1 -0.83*** -2.68 -0.78** -2.54
2 0.11 0.34 0.14 0.42
3 -0.06 -0.20 -0.06 -0.19
4 0.24 0.67 0.25 0.73
[1:4] -0.54 1.46 -0.45 1.42
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Table 4
Weekly cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for large stock price declines
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price decline” if it is below -10%. To
ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.
Expected return is estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. This table reports the
cumulative abnormal returns for decline events over different holding periods. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Event Week CAR t-stat
[1:13] -1.83 -1.52
[4:13] -2.63** -2.04
[1:26] -2.97** -2.38
[4:26] -3.78*** -2.93
[13:26] -1.21 -0.86
[1:52] -4.35*** -3.68
[4:52] -5.16*** -4.02
[13:52] -2.59* -1.95
[26:52] -1.43 -1.27
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Table 5
Weekly cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for large stock price increases
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price increase” if it is above 10%. To
ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.
Expected return is estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. This table reports the
cumulative abnormal returns for increase events over different holding periods. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Event Week CAR t-stat
[1:13] -1.95 -0.68
[4:13] -1.17 -0.39
[1:26] -4.56*** -2.83
[4:26] -3.78** -2.47
[13:26] -2.65* -1.72
[1:52] -5.92*** -3.50
[4:52] -5.14*** -3.16
[13:52] -4.01** -2.54
[26:52] -1.36 -0.51
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Table 6
Weekly abnormal returns (AR) surrounding large stock price declines without a
strong market sentiment
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price decline” if it is below -10%. I
define a market return which falls below -5% as an indicator for strong market sentiment at the
time of event. To ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined
from 2000 to 2006. Expected return is estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Event Week AR(%) t-stat
-2 -1.45*** -3.08
-1 -1.76*** -3.41
0 -13.92*** -25.35
1 1.08* 1.72
2 -0.13 -0.36
3 -0.57 -0.84
4 -0.96* -1.67
[1:4] -0.58 -0.93
[1:52] -4.61*** -3.29
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Table 7
Weekly abnormal returns (AR) surrounding large stock price increases without
a strong market sentiment
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price increase” if it is above 10%. I
define a market return which exceeds 5% as an indicator for strong market sentiment at the time of
event. To ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000
to 2006. Expected return is estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Event Week AR(%) t-stat
-2 -0.87** -1.98
-1 -1.02*** -2.73
0 10.65*** 33.41
1 -0.96** -2.15
2 0.14 0.36
3 -0.23 -0.59
4 -0.48 -0.80
[1:4] -1.53 -0.92
[1:52] -5.71*** 2.27
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Table 8
Weekly abnormal returns (AR) surrounding large stock price declines without
corresponding event in the following week
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price decline” if it is below -10%. To
ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.
Expected return is estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. This table provides
abnormal returns for those decline events without any event in the following week. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Event Week AR(%) t-stat
-2 -0.94** -2.46
-1 -1.57*** -4.38
0 -10.13*** -33.42
1 0.98*** 2.59
2 0.62** 1.81
3 -0.15 -0.74
4 -0.30 -0.92
[1:4] 1.15** 2.03
[1:52] -3.86** -2.35
40
Table 9
Weekly abnormal returns (AR) surrounding large stock price increases without
corresponding event in the following week
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price increase” if it is above 10%. To
ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.
Expected return is estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. This table provides
abnormal returns for those increase events without any event in the following week. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Event Week AR(%) t-stat
-2 -0.43* -1.71
-1 -0.68** -2.06
0 10.17*** 39.52
1 -1.12*** -3.35
2 -0.34* -1.68
3 0.09 0.77
4 0.18 0.94
[1:4] -1.19* 1.92
[1:52] -6.05** -4.83
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Table 10
Weekly abnormal returns (AR) surrounding large stock price declines with
contrarian event in the following week
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price decline” if it is below -10%. To
ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.
Expected return is estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. This table provides
abnormal returns for those decline events with contrarian event in the following week. *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Event Week AR(%) t-stat
-2 -1.75** -2.06
-1 -2.43*** -3.31
0 -12.29*** -8.97
1 10.08*** 13.45
2 0.67 1.28
3 0.82 1.44
4 -0.51 -0.96
[1:4] 11.06*** 4.73
[1:52] -7.94* -1.82
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Table 11
Weekly abnormal returns (AR) surrounding large stock price increases with
contrarian event in the following week
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price increase” if it is above 10%. To
ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.
Expected return is estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. This table provides
abnormal returns for those increase events with contrarian event in the following week. *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Event Week AR(%) t-stat
-2 -1.66 -0.83
-1 -3.28 -1.19
0 11.30*** 9.24
1 -13.07*** -11.65
2 -1.94 -0.87
3 -0.52 -0.31
4 0.15 0.08
[1:4] -15.38** -3.96
[1:52] -3.73 -0.14
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Table 12
Cross-sectional analysis of CAR for the [1:26]-interval for large price declines
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price decline” if it is below -10%. To
ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.
Expected return is estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. This table provides the
results of multivariate regression using the following variables: the return of the event week R0,
the log of the firm size, the log of the market-to-book ratio. The t-statistics are in the parentheses
and the reported coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant -7.4** -5.7** -4.6*
(-2.23) (-2.08) (-1.85)
R0 -33.1* -26.2* -18.4*
(-1.82) (-1.77) (-1.69)
ln(size) -0.049* -0.012
(-1.73) (-1.28)
ln( M
B
) -0.7**
(-2.41)
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Table 13
Cross-sectional analysis of CAR for the [1:26]-interval for large price increases
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price increase” if it is above 10%. To
ensure that there are 52 weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006.
Expected return is estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. This table provides the
results of multivariate regression using the following variables: the return of the event week R0,
the log of the firm size, the log of the market-to-book ratio. The t-statistics are in the parentheses
and the reported coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant -2.1 -1.8 -1.4
(-1.25) (-0.94) (-0.73)
R0 -17.3* -16.5* -14.9
(-1.71) (-1.68) (1.57)
ln(size) -0.031** -0.026**
(2.39) (2.15)
ln( M
B
) -0.68**
(-2.34)
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Table 14
Multivariate analysis of CAR for the [1:26]-interval for large price declines-
industry effects
Each week from 1999 to 2007, weekly returns are formed from the mid-points of the quoted bid
and ask prices from Friday to Friday. Stocks priced below five dollars at the end of event week are
excluded. I define the return on a stock as being a “large price decline” if it is below -10% and the
return on a stock as being a “large price increase” if it is above 10%. To ensure that there are 52
weeks before and after each event, events are defined from 2000 to 2006. Expected return is
estimated using the 52-week data prior to each event. This table provides the influence of the
industry membership of the firms. In my sample, firms are divided into six industry
groups: real estate/construction, energy, consumer/retail, finance/insurance, travel/media, and
telecom/technology. The dummy variable for energy is excluded to prevent a singular matrix. The
t-statistics are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Declines Increases
Real Estate/Construction -0.071 0.014
(-0.83) (0.22)
Consumer/Retail 0.019 0.026
(0.15) (0.41)
Finance/Insurance -0.049 0.003
(-0.52) (0.08)
Travel/Media 0.116 0.087
(1.27) (1.45)
Telecom/Technology -0.063 0.009
(-0.78) (0.11)
